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WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE ANDTHEDURATION OF WORKPLACE INJURIES
ABSTRACT
Thispaper uses a new administrative micro-data set toexamine the effect
of a legislated increase in the minimum and maximum workers' compensation
benefit on the duration of workplace injuries in Minnesota. As aresult of
legislation, workers in some earnings groups received higherbenefits if they
were injured after the effective date of thebenefit increase, while workers
in other earnings groups received the same benefit regardlessof when they
were injured. The analysis compares the change in mean loginjury duration
for workers who were affected by the benefit increase tothat of workers who
were not affected by the benefit increase. The findingsindicate that the
duration of injuries increased by 8 percent more for the groupof workers that
experienced a 5 percent increase in benefits thanfor the group of workers
that had no change in their benefit. Additional findings suggestthat
employees of self-insured firms who are injured onthe job tend to return to





Cambridge, MA 02138Work-related disabilities are an unfortunate and costly consequence of
production. In a typical year, more than fifty times as many working days are
lost to work injuries as are lost to labor strikes, and from one-half to one-
third as many working days are lost to work injuries as are lost to
unemployinent) The total amount of working time foregone because of
work-related disabilities is the product of the incidence of work-related
injuries and the average duration of time spent away from work once an injury
has occurred.2 This paper examines how workers' compensation insurance and
other factors influence the duration of lost work time that results from work-
related injuries and illnesses.
Workers' compensation insurance is the primary public program for workers
who experience a work-related injury or illness. In recent years, nearly
half of all workers who missed one or more days of work because of a work
injury collected workers' compensationbenefits.3 Previous research has
focused on the impact of providing more generous benefits on injured
employees' incentives to return to work. This research is limited, however,
by the difficulty of identifying separate benefit and wage effects because
benefits are typically determined as a function of the worker's pre-disability
wage. Moreover, workers' compensation insurance may also affect employers'
incentives to encourage disabled workers to return to work. In particular,
privately insured firms have little incentive to induce injured workers to
return to work because insurance premiums are often imperfectly experience
rated, while self-insured firms have a stronger incentive because they bear
the full marginal cost of workers' compensation benefits. The effect of
employers' incentives on the duration of workplace injuries has received
little attention in the literature.
In this paper, I use longitudinal data on workers' compensation claims in2
Minnesota to examine how both
employees' and employers' incentives influence
the duration of nonwork spells
following workplace injuries. Theanalysis is
based on an unusual natural
experiment that was created by a legislated
change
in the benefit schedule which raisedthe minimum and maximum benefits
during
the sample period. As a result of
this benefit change, identical workerswho
qualify for the maximum or minimum benefits would
receive different benefit
amounts depending on whether they wereinjured before or after the date of the
benefit change. On the other hand,workers' who did not receive the maximum
or minimum benefits form a control
group because their benefits were the same
regardless of when they were injured. Unlike
previous studies, this natural
experiment allows one to compare the duration of
work injuries for workers in
the same state who earn the exactsame wage but received different workers'
compensation benefits.
This quasi-experiment is used to addressthe following questions: How
does the average duration andcomposition of temporary total workers'
compensation claims respond to changes in benefits?Are short or long term
injuries more responsive to a benefit increase? Doemployees of self-insured
firms who are injured on the job haveshorter spells away from work than
employees of firms that purchase insurance from
private insurance companies or
from the competitive state fund? Doesthe relationship between injury
duration and benefits vary between self-insured
and privately insured firms?
The findings indicate that theaverage duration of temporary total
injuries is extremely responsive to the level ofbenefits paid. A comparison
of changes in durations before and aftera 5 percent increase in the maximum
and minimuj benefits shows that theaverage duration of claims increased by
about 8 percent more for thegroup of workers that experienced a benefit3
increase due to the schedule change than for the group of workers that was
unaffected by the increase in the maximum and minimum benefits. Moreover, the
estimated effect of benefits on the duration of work injuries is qualitatively
different when the natural experiment is ignored and rionlinearities in the
benefit schedule are used to estimate the benefit and wage effects.
In addition, employees of self-insured firms are found to have shorter
spells on workers' compensation than employees of privately insured firms, and
the average duration of injuries is found to be more responsive to the
increase in benefits in imperfectly experience rated firms than in self-
insured firms. These results suggest that employers' insurance incentives
also have an effect on the duration of work injuries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses
relevant institutional features of the Minnesota workers' compensation system
and briefly reviews the past literature. Section II presents several
difference-in-differences estimators of the effect of benefits on injury
duration based on the natural experiment created by the revision in the
benefit schedule. Section III presents multivariate estimates of the effect
of benefits on the duration of injuries based on the exogenous variation in
benefits caused by the change in the benefit schedule. Section IV estimates
the injury duration-benefit elasticity for a sample of workers with short-term
injuries, and for separate samples of self-insured and nonself-insured firms.
Section V contrasts estimates of the injury duration-benefit elasticity
identified by the change in the benefit schedule to those identified by
nonlinearities in the benefit schedule. Section VI contains a summary and
conclusion.4
I. A Description of Workers'
Compensation Insurance
Temporary total injuries are the most
common type of claim in the
workers' compensation system. A
temporary total injury is one thatrenders an
employee completely unable to work fora finite period of time. Mostinjuries
are initially classified as atemporary total claim. Cases
involving injuries
that result in some form of
permanent impairment are reclassifiedas either a
permanent partial or permanent total case
upon attaining maximum medical
improvement, depending on whether theworker is healthy enough toreturn to
work and on the type of impairment.
In well over 90% ofcases, employees
return to work upon attaining maximummedical improvement.4
Figure 1 displays the schedule thatwas used to compute weekly benefits
for temporary total cases inMinnesota in the beginning of l986.In essence,
the workers' compensation benefit
equals two-thirds of a workers'
Pre-disability weekly wage, subject to amaximum weekly benefitpayment
($342), and a minimum weekly benefit
payment ($171). There is a further
stipulation, however, that workers' whose
earnings make them subject to the
minimum benefit be paid theirweekly wage if their weeklywage is less than
the minimum. Lastly, there isa second minimum ($68.40) thatestablishes a
absolute floor for benefits,
even for workers who earn less than thesecond
minimujn. It can be observed from
Figure 1 that this benefit structurecreates
a "two-tier" minimums in whichworkers earning less that $256.50per week are
paid the first minimum ($171)if their Pre-disabijjtywage exceeds the first
minimum, exactly theirwage if it is between the first minimum andthe
absolute minimum, or theabsolute minimum if theirwage is less than this
absolute floor.



























simplification of the actual benefit computationformula. The value of
certain fringe benefits, such as room and board,will be added to the weekly
wage to compute benefits in cases where the provision of these
fringes is
curtailed as a result of the injury.Furthermore, minors and apprentices who
experience an injury that is expected to result inany permanent impairment
are paid the maximum benefit regardless of their
pre-injury earnings.
Finally, if an employee has a second job, his combinedearnings from both jobs
will be used to calculate the workers'compensation benefit.6 In most
temporary total cases, however, Figure 1 represents therelationship between
past earnings and workers' compensation benefits.
Maximum and minimum benefits are revised eachyear on October 1 by the
Minnesota legislature to keep pace withpast statewide wage growth. The
maximum and minimum benefits are specifiedas a certain percentage of the
average weekly wage for the calendar year ending on December 31 ofthe
preceding year. For example, the maximum benefitpayable is 100 percent of
the statewide average weeklywage. Injuries that occur on or after October 1
are subject to the new benefit schedule, while thosethat occurred prior to
October 1. remain subject to the former benefitschedule. The next section
demonstrates how legislated changes in the minimumand maximum benefits can be
used to estimate the impact of benefitson the duration of claims.
Benefits are payable for the duration of thedisability in temporary
total cases. However, an employeror insurer may initiate administrative
proceedings to discontinue benefits if it believes thatan employee has
recovered from his or her disability but continuesto receive workers'
compensation benefits. In Minnesota, an employermay not dismiss an employee
for pursuing a workers' compensation claim.Most cases are concluded without6
an administrative proceeding, and in the vast majority of temporary total
cases, employees return to work for their former employer.7
Because workers' compensation insurance reduces the financial burden of
work injuries, many observers have hypothesized that more generous
workers' compensation benefits will lead workers to increase their reservation
wage for returning to work (e.g., Richard Butler and John Worrall, 1985). A
higher reservation wage, in turn, will lead injured workers to prolong their
spell on workers' compensation insurance.
One problem with this argument is that most injured workers return to
their former job at exactly their pvc-disability wage.8 As a consequence,
their reservation wage must be no higher than it was before the injury
occurred. A more plausible explanation for a positive relationship between
benefits and work injuries is that workers experience greater disutility from
work the more quickly they return to work after suffering an injury. For
example, a back injury is likely to cause an employee more pain if he returns
to work after resting one day than after resting one week. In this view,
higher benefits increase average durations by raising workers' reservation
health level, which explains why wages are typically unchanged after spells on
workers' compensation insurance.
Past studies have typically found a positive relationship between the
average duration of workers' compensation spells and the benefitlevel. For
example, Butler and Worrall (1985) estimate that a 10 percent increase in
benefits is associated with a 3.8 percent increase in the length of temporary
total lower back injury claims using data for Illinois.9 As Ehrenberg (1988)
notes, however, the fact that benefits are a nondecreasing. nonlinearfunction
of the predisability wage makes it impossible to disentangle the effect of7
benefits from the effect of wages in a
cross-sectional study of one state's
workers' compensation program. Since workers ofdifferent earnings levels may
have different motivation and attachment to work, theworker's pre-disability
wage rate may directly influence the length of workers' compensation
spells
and thus confound estimates of the effect of benefits.
Furthermore, a cross-state analysis of the effect of benefitson duration
is unavoidably hindered by the fact thatmany relevant institutional factors
besides benefits differ across the states. Forexample, disabled workers are
required to wait between three and seven days to becomeeligible for benefits,
depending on the state. The waiting period will influence themeasured
average duration of claims in a state. Similarly, unobserved differences in
the administration of workers' compensation lawsare likely to affect the
duration of injuries. Studies of injury duration basedon inter-state
variations in benefits, such as John Worrall, RichardButler, Philip Borba and
David Durbin (1989) and William Johnson and Jan Ondrich(1989), are unable to
control for all the institutional features of workers'compensation insurance
that vary across states.
II.EnrntricalEvidence on Benefits and Injury Duration: A NaturalExperiment
Increases in the minimum and maximum benefits createa natural experiment
that can be used to estimate the effect of
increasing workers' compensation
10 benefits on the duration of work injury claims. Figure 2 illustrates how
this experiment works. As a result of thelegislated, nonretroactjve increase
in the maximum benefit and minimum benefits,individuals whose pre-disability
earnings place them on segments A, C, and E of Figure 1 receiveda 5 percent





































































































































































































































































































































were injured before that date. For example, the
weekly benefit increased from
$342 to $360 for high-wage earners on October1, 1986.11 On the other hand,
workers whose earnings fall intosegments B and D form natural control
groups
because their benefit was the sameregardless of when they were injured.
Finally, the small sample of individuals withearnings in the gray areas
between the distinct earningssegments are excluded from the analysis because
their benefits increased by an amount between 0and 5 percent.
If more generous benefits truly inducelonger workers' compensation
spells, we should observe longer spell durations forthose in segments A, C
and E who were injured after October 1 thanfor those with the same earnings
but with injuries pre-dating the October 1increase. Furthermore, the
experience of individuals in segments B and D allowus to control for any
other changes that might have occurred inthis time period. Time-varying
factors that affect the duration of claims
(e.g., possible changes in
administrative procedures) can be differencedout by computing the difference
in the change in average duration betweenindividuals on segments A, C and E,
and those on segments B and D before andafter the benefit change. Moreover,
there are six possible pairings of "treatment"and "control" groups because of
the two-tier structure of minimums.
D4ta and Emojrjcpl Results
The data analyzed here are taken fromadministrative records on temporary
total claims filed by insurers and self-insuredemployers in Minnesota. This
data set contains a rich collection ofinformation on the duration of claims,
injury characteristics form of insurance,
pre-disability wage, weekly
benefit, and demographic characteristic ofworkers' compensation recipients.
The original data set contains 33,015temporary total workers' compensation9
claims for injuries that occurred in 1986.12 To eliminate gross errors in the
benefit and wage data, the sample is restricted to individuals whose reported
temporary total benefit is within $10 of the benefit that is calculated from
the applicable benefit schedule and the reported weekly wage. Less than 5
percent of observations were deleted by thiscriterion.13
The data set includes all claims for temporary total injuries in
Minnesota that originated in 1986 and closed by July 1989; incomplete spells
are truncated. But because an estimated 99 percent of temporary total
workers' compensation claims close in less than three years, the truncation of
incomplete spells does not present a serious problem (Minnesota Department of
Labor and Industry, 1988, P. 29). Furthermore, in a later specification I
avoid the truncation issue entirely by restricting the sample to short-term
injuries, such as broken fingers and sprained ankles; virtually all of these
injuries would have closed in the sample period.
14
Table 1 summarizes estimates of the change in duration of temporary total
injuries that occurred before and after the benefit increases for each
earnings category. The table shows a clear pattern. There is a statistically
significant increase in the average duration of temporary total claims after
October 1 for each of the three groups of workers (segment A,C,E of Figure 2)
for which benefits were increased. For example, workers in group E, who
qualified for the maximum benefit, had an average log duration of 1.101 weeks
if they were injured before the benefit increase, and an average log duration
of 1.233 if they were injured after the benefit increase. The difference
between these two numbers, which is reported in Column 3, indicates that the
average duration of claims increased by about 13.2 percent for workerswho
received the higher maximum benefit. The average duration of claims increasedTable 1
Duration and Benefit for Temporary Total Disabilities.
Average Before and After Changes in Hinnesota Benefit Schedule5


















































































a.New schedule was effective October 1, 1986. Earnings segments refer to
Figure 2.
b. Sample sizes are: 582 for segment A; 3,590 for segment B; 5.405 for
segment C; 12,297 for segment D; and 5,189 for segment E.
*One—tailt—test of difference is statistically significant at .05 level.
**One—tailt—test of differenc, is statistically significant at .01 level.10
by a similar magnitude, 11 percent. for workers at the first minimum, and by
24 percent for the sample of workers at the absolute minimum.
In contrast, workers in the two earnings segments (B and D) that had no
benefit change in spite of the higher maximum and minimums, exhibit no
statistically significant change in their average duration of claims after
October 1st.15 This finding suggests that the observed longer durations for
workers who received the higher benefits would not have occurred in the
absence of the benefit increase.
The average log weekly benefit is reported in Table I to measure the
benefit changes during the sample periods. As noted earlier, benefits
increased by 5 percent for those who receive the maximum or one of the minimum
benefits. However, because the weekly wage is inferred from the First Report
Form and in some cases does not reflect the wage rate that was actually used
to determine benefits (e.g., wages from secondary employment and fringe
benefits are omitted), the benefit does not increase by exactly 5 percent for
individuals in segments A, C, and E. Nonetheless, the measured benefit
increases for the period after October 1 are extremely close to 5 percent for
workers in segments A, C, and E. In addition, the change in the average log
benefit is statistically insignificant and trivial for the groups of workers
in segments B and D, which were not affected by the maximum or minimum benefit
increase. Consequently, workers on segment B and D appear to form valid
control groups.
A difference-in-differences estimate of the elasticity of the average
temporary total duration with respect to benefits ().can be calculated from
the information reported in Table 1 as —(Tt
-T)/(B
- where
Tk is the change in average log duration for workers in segment k and is11
the change in the average log benefit forworkers in segment k. Sixpossible
elasticities can be Calculated because there
are three groups that experienced
a benefit increase (i's), and twogroups that had an insignificant change in
their benefit (i's). The estimatedelasticities are:
AB AD ,—3.68 —3.39
CB CD —1.69 —1.22
EB ED —2.11 —1.67
Even if we discount the two large elasticitiesderived from the imprecise
estimate for segment A, the above elasticitiesare substantial. The
unweighted average of the elasticities, excluding those
based on segment A, is
1.67. This estimate is much larger than
the elasticity that Butler and
Worrall reported for temporary total backcases, and somewhat larger than
Johnson and Ondrichs estimated
elasticity for permanent partial cases.
Figure 3 contains plots of the weeklyreturn-to-work hazard rate for
workers in Segment E (the maximumbenefit), depending on whether the injury
occurred before or after the benefit increase.
The figure depicts the
proportion of ongoing injuries thatcloseeach week, through the fiftieth
week. For both groups of workers, theplots show a sharply declining hazard
rate. Overall, more than half of allcases end within the first month, and
nearly three-quarters end within the first twomonths. The mean injury
duration is 8 weeks.
In each of the first seven weeks, theexit rate is greater for workers
who were injured before the benefitincrease than for those who were injured
prior to the benefit increase. Over the















































































































































































































































rate of those with higher benefits exceeds the hazard rate of thosewith lower
benefits. After three months, the hazard rates look aboutthe same for both
groups of workers. Plots of the hazard rate for workers in Segments A and
C,
which are not reported here, show a similarpattern to Figure 3. These
results suggest that benefit increases have a somewhatgreater effect on
recipients with relatively short term injuries.
Finally, notice that Table 1 also shows that theaverage duration of
workers' compensation spells increases withearnings in this sample. For
example, workers with weekly earnings below $68.40 onaverage have
substantially shorter injury spells than workers who earn inexcess of $560
per week. This finding is surprising in view of past cross-sectionalstudies,
which found that average duration increases with theproportion of lost wages
replaced by workers' compensation benefits, because individualswith low
earnings have a higher replacement rate than individuals withhigh earnings.
As will be discussed below, the negativerelationship between replacement
rates and duration illustrates the difficulty ofdrawing inferences when there
is not exogenous variation in benefits andwages.
composition of Injuries
An increase in benefits may affect the incidenceas well as the duration
of workers' compensation claims. Therefore, thecomposition of temporary
total injuries may be affected by an increase in thebenefit level. A
composition change would result if, for example, theavailability of more
generous benefits after a benefit increaseencourages some workers with
relatively minor injuries to pursue claims that they would otherwisehave
ignored in the absence of a benefit increase. On the otherhand, higher
benefits may induce some workers to takemore risks on the job, which may13
result in more serious injuries.
Table 2 explores the impact of changing benefits on the composition of
workers' compensation claims by estimating the relative frequency of claims
for various types of injuries for workers on the different segments of Figure
2, before and after the benefit increase. The results indicate that the
relative frequency of injuries involving bone fractures increased slightly for
workers who experienced a benefit increase, but was hardly changed for workers
on the segments that were unaffected by the benefit increase. The relative
frequency of fractures after October 1 increased by an averageof 3 percent
for workers on segments A, C, and E, while there was a slight decrease in the
relative frequency of cases involving fractures for workers in segments B and
D. On the other hand, there is no discernable difference in the patternof
changes in the share of cases involving sprains, back injuries, or multiple
injuries for workers in the different benefit segments.
III. çontrollnz for Covariate
Because of potential compositional changes in workers' compensation
recipients in response to a change in benefits, it isdesirable to control for
covariates in estimating the duration response to a benefit increase.In the
absence of truncation and censoring, the log-linear multiple regressionmodel
corresponds to a class of duration models known as theaccelerated failure
time model. The accelerated failure time model encompasses a wide arrayof
parametric duration models, including the Weibull model,the log-normal model,
the generalized gamma model, and the log-logistic model (see JohnKalbfleisCh
and Ross Prentice, 1980; Chapter 2). As noted previously, lessthan one
percent of the temporary total claims aretruncated in this data set, so theTable 2
Relitiv. Frequency of Selected Injuries, Before end After BenefitChange
(1) (2) (3)
EarningaSegment Injured Injured Difference of
1/1/86—9/30/86 10/1/86—12/31/86 (2) and (1)
Segment A —Treatment
BackInjury .172 .126 —.066
(.018) (.029) (.036)
Fracture .098 .170 .072'
(.016) (.032) (.03).)
Sprain .609 .326 —.083*
(.023) (.040) (.048)
Multiple InjurIes .107 .089 —.018
(.015) (.025) (.030)
£e.went 3 —Control
Back Injury .283 .228 —.054*'
(.009) (.016) (.017)
Fracture .059 .052 —.008
(.005) (.008) (.009)
Sprain .496 .450 —.046*
(.010) (.017) (.020)
Multiple Injuries .092 .114 .021*
(.006) (.011) (.012)
Sereent C —Treatment
Back Injury .286 .268 —.017
(.007) (.012) (.014)
Fracture .058 .065 .007
(.004) (.007) (.007)
Sprain .493 .491 —.002
(.008) (.014) (.016)
Multiple Injuries .090 .096 .006
(.004) (.008) (.009)
Sersent D —Control
BackInjury .275 .258 —.017*
(.005) (.008) (.009)
Fracture .070 .074 .004
(.003) (.005) (.005)
Sprain .484 .464 _.020*
(.005) (.009) (.011)
Multiple Injuries .098 .107 .009
(.003) (.006) (.006)
Sejisent E —Treatment
Back Injury .272 .267 —.003
(.007) (.012) (.014)
Fracture .072 .087 .015*
(.004) (.008) (.008)
Sprain .503 .486 —.017
(.006) (.013) (.016)
Multiple injurIes .118 .119 .001
(.005) (.009) (.010)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See notes to Table 1 for details.14
log-linear regression model seems a preferable alternative for estimating the
duration of temporary total claims than making parametric distributional
assumptions to handle truncation.
A fairly general model to explain the duration of injury spells as a
function of benefits and other covariates is:









whereTi is the completed spell duration for worker i. The variables denoted
by a capital letter, B. C or
are dummy variables that indicate the
earnings segment along the horizontal axis of Figure 2 in which each worker is
categorized. For example, if worker i earns less than $68.40 per week, dummy
variable A will equal 1 and the other dummies (B C, D) will equal zero.
These dummy variables are interacted with the log of the weekly wage to allow
for piecewise linear effects of past earnings on injury spells. Parameters
are denoted by greek letters. The coefficient, t, is the elasticity of injury
duration with respect to benefits, which is assumed constant across
individuals. The vector denotes covariates, including dummies for the type
of injury and insurance arrangement, and is a random disturbance.
Furthermore, since the benefit level changed for workers in some earnings
groups but not for workers in other groups, equation (1) could also include a
dummy variable, Zj which equals 1 if the worker was injured after the benefit
increase went into effect, and 0 otherwise. Including z, as shown in
equation (2), will net out additive period effects that might be correlated15
with the change in benefits.









Thewage terms in equation (2) are designed to absorb the benefit
schedule at a point in time. Therefore, the variation inbenefits due to the
nonlinear benefit schedule has been partialied out. But inMinnesota there is
also idiosyncratic variation in benefits for workers whoearn the same wage
because, in some cases, benefits are affected by thepayment of fringe
benefits, apprenticeship status, and other factors.Additionally, the
observed wage variable is measured with someerror because it is derived from
the First Report. If equation (2) is estimatedby Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) effect of the benefit is identified by bothidiosyncratic variation in
benefits (at the same wage) and by the change in the benefit scheduie)6
Since the idiosyncratic variation in benefits isnot necessarily a
legitimate source of variation to use to identify the benefitelasticity, it
is desirable to estimate the benefit elasticity fromvariations in benefits
that are solely due to the interteniporalchange in the benefit schedule. This
is accomplished by estimating equation (2)by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS),
using dummy variables indicating whether an individual is insegment A.B.C or
D and injured after the benefit change,along with the included variables in
(2), as instruments for the benefit variable. In otherwords, equation (2) is
identified by the exclusion restriction of thevector of interactions, (zj.Ai,
z1'B1, z1•C1, zi.Dj). It should be noted that if the legislated benefit16
change was the only source of linearly independent variations inbenefits,
then estimation of equation (2) by 2SLS and by OLS would beidentical.
Estimates
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 present OLS estimates ofequation (2), and
Columns 3 and 4 present 2SLS estimates. In both the OLS and2SLS estimates,
the first equation excludes covariates, and the secondequation includes
several covariatesMeans and standard deviations of the variables are also
provided in the table.'7
The OLS estimates yield a larger benefit elasticity than the 2SLS
estimates. Moreover, a Hausman test rejects the hypothesis that the OLSand
2SLS estimates of the benefit elasticity are equal at the .05level, whether
covariates are included or excluded from the equation. Since the benefit
effect in the 2SLS equation is identified solely by variation createdby a
legislative act that could reasonably be taken as exogenous in thiscase, the
idiosyncratic variation in benefits is not likely to be a legitimate source of
variation to use to identify the benefit elasticity. For thisreason, the
2SLS estimate, which relies solely on time-series variation inbenefits, is
probably more reliable.
The elasticity estimated by 2SLS without covariates is 1.83 (t—2.ll),
which is similar in magnitude to the difference-in-differences elasticities
presented in Section 2. The addition of covariates slightly reduces the
estimated benefit elasticity in both the OLS and 2SLS estimates,suggesting
that compositional changes are not very significant. The estimatedelasticity
of 1.67 in Column 4 implies that a 10 percent increase in benefits would
increase the average duration of temporary total work injuries by one week.
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a. SapIe size is 25,446. Stsndard errors of estimates are
of the dependent variable ii .924 (1.506).
b. The omitted insurance arrangement Is private insurance; the
part time; th. omitted ownership typeis unincorporated; the
laborer; the omitted age group is 16—24 year olds.
in parentheses. Mean (SD)
omitted work schedule Is
omitted occupation is
c. Estab. size is the average nuaberofemployees per •stablishaent in the industry.
d. The 28 nature of injury duismies are: amputation, burnfromheat, chemical burn,
concussion,infective or parasitic disease, contusion, Cut, dermatitis, dislocation.
electric shock, fracture, hypothermic, hearing impairment, hernia, Inflammation of
joints, systemic poisoning, radiation exposure, scratch, hemorrhoids, hepatitis.
multiple Injuries, atmospheric pressure, circulatory system, eye disease, nervous
system disorder, respiratory system disorder, hearing Impairment, and miscellaneous
injuries. The 7 body parts are: head or face, neck, upper extremities, lower
extremities, multiple parts, body system, and nonclassifjable parts. The omitted
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table to test whether the instruments are orthogonal
to the residual in the
2SLS equations. Although these specification test resultssuggest that the
model is correctly specified, the results are notcompelling in view of the
imprecision of the instrumented coefficient. On the other hand, thequasi-
experimental nature of the instruments lends some additionalsupport for the
plausibility of the 2SLS estimation strategy.
The coefficients on the wage terms indicate that the
pre-disability wage
has a complicated, nonlinear effect on injury duration.Within most of the
earnings brackets, the duration decreases with the wage rate, as evidencedby
the negative coefficients on the wage-earningssegment interactions. It
should also be noted that the dummy for injuriesoccurring after October 1 is
statistically insignificant, suggesting that period effects are unimportant.
The estimated coefficients for the remaining covariatesare very similar
in the OLS and 2SLS models. The point estimates indicate thatthe duration of
temporary total spells is about 10 percent shorter in self-insured firms than
in privately insured firms (the omitted dummy variable), and thatthe duration
of spells is about 15 percent shorter in firms insuredby the Minnesota State
Fund than by a private insurance carrier. Moreover, thedifference in the
duration between self-insured firms and the State Fund isnot statistically
significant. The spell length is longest at firms covered by the Minnesota
Assigned Risk Pool, which only accepts firms with inferior safety records.
A discussed in more detail below, a possible explanation for theshorter
injury duration at self-insured firms than privately insured firms is that
self-insured employers bear the full marginal cost of benefits, while
insurance premiums are only partially adjusted accident costsat privately
insured firms. This financial arrangement provides self-insured firms witha18
strong incentive relative to privately insured firms
to encourage workers to
return to work quickly after an injury. On the
other hand, the group of firms
that selects into self-insurance
may have injuries that are less severe than
privately insured firms, even after controlling forobservable covariates.
The estimates also indicate that men have
shorter injury spells than
women, white collar workers have shorter injury spells thanblue collar
workers, and younger workers have shorter injuryspells than older workers.
Interestingly, being married tends to extend the length oftime on workers'
compensation insurance for women, but has no effect formen. Employees who
work in larger establishments return to work afterinjuries faster than
employees in smaller establishments, perhaps due to the factthat it is easier
to facilitate injured workers in large establishments.'8Larger
establishments are also more likely to be experiencerated.
Several injury characteristic dummy variablesare included in the
equations estimated in Columns 2 and 4 but not reported in thetable. To
summarize their effects, the results indicate that injuriesinvolving an
amputation, nervous disorder, hernia, or heart ailment, andinjuries to the
back and to multiple body parts have relativelylong spell durations. On the
other hand, scratches, cuts, contusions, and injuriesto the lower extremities
have relatively short spell durations.
IV.Estimatesfor Selected Subspmples
A. Short-Term Injuries
Table 4 presents 2SLS estimates of injury duration equationsincluding
covariates for several different samples. For convenience, Column 1
replicates the estimates for the full sample. Column 2 presents an estimate19
of the same equation for the subset of workers with injuries that on average
close in less than 10 weeks. The sample of short-term injuries includes such
injuries as lacerations, scratches, and poison ivy infections.'9 The purpose
of presenting results for the sample of workers with short-term injuries is
twofold. First, it is likely that none of the spell durations for these types
of injuries is truncated. Second, it is useful to know whether the duration
of short-term injuries is relatively more responsive to changes in benefits.
The results for the sample of workers with short-term injuries are
similar to those for the overall sample. The effect of benefits on injury
duration is slightly greater in the sample of short-term injuries than in the
full sample. The difference in the benefit elasticities, however, is not
statistically significant. In addition, the effect of the covariates is
similar in the sample of short-term injuries and in the full sample. These
results suggest that, as expected, truncation of very long-term injuries in
this sample has little effect on the estimates.
B. Form of Insurance
In Minnesota, employers can satisfy their workers' compensation insurance
requirement by purchasing insurance from a private insurance carrier or from
the competitive state insurance fund, or by self-insuring. Permission to
self-insure is typically only granted to large, financially solvent firms.2°
Employers who are unable to provide insurance through other means may be
eligible for coverage by the Minnesota State Assigned Risk Pool, which insures
high-risk firms. Privately insured firms account for approximately 70 percent
of injuries, and self-insured firms account for nearly 20 percent of injuries.
The Minnesota Competitive State Fund is relatively new and quite small,
handling just 3 percent of injuries that occur in the state. The alternativeTable 4
2SLS EstItate5ofUorkers Conpcnsatjon Spelt Durationg forSsl.ct.d
Full Short—Tern Self—Insured Nonsalf_In,ur.d Saple Injuries Ecployers Eaployare Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept —10.181 —10.700 5.705 —13.101 (4.934) (5.387) (11.202) (5.503)
Log(WeeklyBenefit) 1.668 1.814 —1.214 2.270
(.838) (.915) (1.907) (.933)
A 3.907 3.724 3.124 4.036
(1.665) (1.810) (4.143) (1.851)
B 10.343 10.819 —2.994 13.134
(6.980) (5.436) (11.379) (5.550)
C ).444 5.693 2.390 5.661
(1.473) (1.602) (3.856) (1.614)
D 9.961 10.326 —5.673 12.581
(5.294) (5.780) (11.977) (5.910)
Log(WeeklyWage) .241 .181 .363 .163
(.130) (.143) (.297) (.148)
Astog(WeeklyWage) —.216 —.139 —1.054 —.062
(.201) (.216) (.638) (.217)
BeLo8(WeeklyWage) —1.749 —1.835 .501 —2.235
(.853) (.930) (1.954) (.950)
C.Log (Weekly Wage) —.766 —.606 —.502 —.749
(.239) (.259) (.645) (.260)
DiLog(WeeklyWage) —1.594 —1.653 .902 —2.010
(.846) (.924) (1.915) (.945)
Injured after Oct. 1 .014 —.018 .043 .011
(.028) (.030) (.061) (.031)
Insurance Arraneceent
Self Insured —.090 —.100
(.028) (.030)
Assigned Risk .131 .134 .120
(.037) (.040) (.037)
State Fund —.153 —.174 —.156
(.056) (.059) (.055) Vork Schedule
Full Ti.. —.124 —.076 —.125 —.106
(.035) (.039) (.084) (.039)
Seasonal
..023 .128 —.130 .047
(.064) (.070) (.181) (.069)
Irregular Hrs. .210 .242 —.074 .295
(.078) (.083) (.170) (.089) Eaoloyer Chareceeristics
Log(Avg.Estab.Size) —.042 —.033 —.054 —.047
(.006) (.009) (.016) (.009)
Private Corporation —.025 —.023 .185 —.143
(.029) (.032) (.054) (.036)
Public Adainlacration —.090 —.063 —.024 .269
(.062) (.070) (.078) (.142)
—Continued—Table 4 (Continued)
Full Short—Term Self—Insured Nonsel(—Insured
Sample Injuries Employers Employers
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
0ccuatiOfl
Professional —.206 —.163 —.101 —.212
(.050) (.054) (.093) (.061)
Manager —.265 —.242 —.303 —.273
(.054) (.059) (.160) (.057)
Clerical —.185 —.194 —.037 —.223
(.045) (.049) (.103) (.050)
Crafts .043 .031 .178 .006
(.031) (.033) (.082) (.033)
Operative .091 .078 .216 .065
(.028) (.030) (.071) (.031)
Service —.144 —.142 —.059 —.142
(.032) (.035) (.072) (.037)
Farm Worker .308 .233 — .241
(.128) (.137) (.128)
Demoeraoh ice
Male —.101 —.120 —.217 —.072
(.032) (.035) (.072) (.036)
Married .072 .092 .034 .076
(.034) (.038) (.069) (.039)
Hale •Harried —.075 —.102 —.005 —.087
(.040) (.045) (.088) (.046)
Age 25—34 .171 .147 .245 .156
(.028) (.030) (.083) (.030)
Age 35—44 .325 .302 .330 .337
(.032) (.035) (.086) (.035)
Ag.45—54 .385 .367 .373 .402
(.036) (.039) (.092) (.040)
Age 55+ .640 .417 .516 .425
(.039) (.043) (.096) (.044)
2.098 2.038 2.110 2.088
Chi—Squ.areOver—ID .499 .306 .512 .766
Statistic(DF—3)
Sample Size 25,446 20.910 5,021 20,425
Not.,:
a.All equations include 7 part of body dummies. Columns land 4 include 28 nature
of injury dummies; Column 2 includes 27 nature of injury dummies; and Column 3
includes 25 nature of injury dummies. S.. notes to Tabi. 3 for ether details.20
insurance arrangements provide different incentivesfor firms to invest
resources in accident prevention and to rehabilitatedisabled employees.
In the event of a work-related injury, self-insured
firms are required to
provide the same level of workers' compensation benefits
as firms that are
insured through private carriers or the state.Self-insurers must maintain a
security account with a balance of at least 110 percent of their
expected
annual workers' compensation costs. The firm'ssubsequent Workers'
compensation losses are drawn from this account. As a result,self-insurers
bear the full marginal cost of injuries.
In contrast, insurance premiums for firms coveredby the state fund,
private carriers, or the Assigned Risk Pool are imperfectly modifiedto
reflect an employer's past loss experience. Insurancepremiums are typically
determined by a weighted average of the firm's last threeyear's accident
experience and the average accident experience in the firm'sindustry.
Greater weight is placed on the firm's past insurance losses forlarger firms.
At one extreme, very small firms are "manual rated," whichmeans they are
charged the insurance rate for their industry listed in the state's rating
manual regardless of their actual experience. Forvery large firms, most or
all of the weight is placed on the firm's own experience. Louise Russel
(1973) estimates that more than 80 percent of employees work in firms thatare
not fully experience rated for their workers' compensation costs.
Moreover, even in fully experience-rated firms, the typical experience-
rating formula places greater emphasis on the incidence of past workers'
compensation claims than on the severity (i.e., duration x average benefit) of
injuries in determining experience-rating offset. This practice, known as
"loss limitations," is accomplished by discounting the amount of losses21
incurred for claimS that cost more than $2,000, and by capping the maximum
loss for a claim. The severity of injuries is given little weight in
experience rating modifications because the conventional view in the insurance
industry is that the duration of work injuries is beyond the employers'
control (National Council on Compensation Insurance, 1982).
There are several ways, however, in which an employer might be able to
affect the duration of an employee's workers' compensation claim. First, an
employer could modify a disabled employee's work environment to accommodate
his or her disability. Second, an employer could arrange for a temporarily
disabled employee to perform alternate job tasks until he or she is fully
recovered. Third, an employer could have an employee initially return to work
on a part-time basis. Fourth, an employer could apply pressure on the
employee to rapidly return to work. Finally, an employer might file for a
discontinuance of benefits or challenge a claim if it is believed that a
beneficiary is malingering.
A comparison of the duration of temporary total claims in self-insured
and nonseif-insured firms provides a test of whether firms' incentives
influence the amount of work time their employees lose after a workplace
injury. Because self-insured firms directly bear a greater share of the
marginal cost of providing workers' compensation benefits to employees, these
firms have a greater incentive to induce their workers to quickly return to
work. The regression results in Table 3 indicate that self-insured firms have
about a 10% shorter average injury duration than privately insured firms.21
Moreover, in results not reported here, self-insured firms were found to have
shorter injury durations than privately insured firms in a variety of
homogeneous injuries, including hernias, broken fingers, and sprained ankles.22
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 further
explore differences in injury
durations between self-insured and
flonself.insured firms byestimating
separate injury duration equations for these
types of employers. The results
are suggestive. The benefit elasticity is
greater for nonself-jnsured firms
than for the full sample, and the benefit
elasticity is negative (butvery
imprecise) and statistically insignificant forself-insured firms. These
results provide some support for the viewthat the effect ofproviding more
generous benefits on employees' injury spells is
tempered if employers' have a
stronger incentive to have workers return to work.
V. Estimates Identified by Nonhinearitiesin the Benefit Schedule
In the absence of experimental data
on benefit changes, it has been
common for researchers to estimate the effect of socialinsurance benefits
(which are a nonlinear function of wages)
by restricting the functional form
of wages. In the context of equation 2, thisis equivalent to assuming that
the piecewise log linear wage terms should beexcluded from the equation.
Although this restriction is overwhelmingly rejectedby the estimates in Table
3, it is natural to question how sensitive theestimates would be to
functional form restrictions of thistype.
Table 5 presents several OLS injury durationregressions that are
identified by restricting the functional form of thewage term.22 Variations
in the benefit variable in these specificationsare primarily due to
nonhinearities in the benefit formula. These estimatesare meant to provide a
comparison to the specifications previously estimated in the literature(e.g.,
Butler and Jorrall, 1985). In general, thisexercise shows that the benefit
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based on functional form.
The log of the benefit and the log of the wage are entered as separate
regressors in the first three columns of Table 5. In these specifications,
the benefit has a small but statistically significant, positive effect on the
duration of claims, and the wage has a statistically insignificant, negative
effect on claim duration. The magnitude of the benefit elasticity is close to
Butler and Worrall's (1985) Weibull model estimate for Illinois, but
substantially smaller than that implied by the natural experiment studied
here.
Columns 4.6 of Table 5 enter the log of the replacement rate (weekly
benefit divided by weekly wage) in place of the separate wage and benefit
variables. This specification constrains the benefit and wage to have equal
but opposite signed effects, which imposes a more restrictive functional form
assumption than Columns 1-3. This modification in the specification yields a
strikingly different result: A higher ratio of the benefit to the wage is
associated with a shorter duration of time spent on workers' compensation
insurance. Given that the benefit and wage have opposite signs in Columns
1-3, the negative effect of the replacement rate is counterintuitive.
The dramatic difference between the two different specifications in
Table 5 can be traced to the strong multicolinearity between the benefit and
wage variables. To see this, denote B as the benefit and W as the wage, and
let b1 equal the benefit coefficient and b2 the wage coefficient in the
specification in Columns 1-3. Using the omitted-variable formula, the
coefficient on the log replacement rate, a1, in the restrictive specification
estimated in Columns 4-6 can be decomposed as:24
(3) a1 —b1
+
(b1+b2)x Cov(ln W,ln B/W) /Var(lnB/J)
Substituting into equation (3), the coefficient on thelog replacement
rate in Column 4 is -.308 .319 +(.319-.051)x ( -.124 /.053). The
variance in the replacement rate (.053) isrelatively low because benefits are
nearly a linear transformation of wages. Moreover, thereplacement rate
declines sharply with wages, which leads to thelarge negative covariance
between the two variables.
Lastly, it should be noted that the estimated negative effect ofthe
replacement rate on spell durations is not entirelysurprising in light of the
cross-sectional relationship between wages and mean spell durationdiscussed
in regards to Table 1. Higher paid workers tend to havea lower replacement
rate and a longer injury duration, on average. Moreover, the fact thatthe
effect of the replacement rate on nonwork spells isonly one-third as large in
magnitude in Column 6 as in Column 4 suggests that the variablesmeasuring the
workers' occupation, extent of injury, and demographic characteristicscan
account for a large portion of the negative effect of the replacementrate.
This finding may result because, other things equal, high-pay workers have
more dangerous jobs, or because high-pay workers are less likely topursue
claims for minor injuries.
The qualitatively different estimates of the effect of benefitson
duration in the two specifications in Table 5 exemplify how incorrect
inference can be drawn about the effect of socialprograms when nonlinearities
in replacement rate formulas generate the main source of variations in
23 benefits and wages.25
VI. Summary and Conclusion
This paper has explored the effect of the workers' compensation insurance
system on the duration of workplace injuries. The analysis focuses on a
natural experiment that increased benefits for some workers, but left benefits
unchanged for other workers. This natural experiment is used to estimated the
effect of providing more generous benefits on the duration of work injuries.
In addition, incentive effects for employers' to facilitate and expedite their
employees' return to work are also considered.
In a period when benefits were increased by 5 percent for workers who
qualify for the minimum or maximum workers' compensation benefit, the average
duration ofan injury spell was found to have increased by 8 percent for the
group of workers that received the higher minimum or maximum, but was
virtually unchanged for workers who were unaffected by the benefit change.
Moreover, the benefit response tends to be greater for workers who have short-
term injuries. Although it is unlikely that these findings could have
occurred by chance, one might be skeptical of the magnitude of the estimated
impact of benefits on the duration of claims in this natural experiment
because it is much larger than previously published estimates of the benefit-
injury duration elasticity.
Oneexplanationfor the larger estimated effect of benefits in this study
than in previous analyses of workers' compensation is that the variation in
benefits is genuinely exogenous in the data considered here, whereas
identification of independent benefit and wage effects is problematic in the
past literature. Support for this interpretation comes from a recent paper by
Bruce Meyer, Kip Viscusi and David Durbin (1989), which examines changes in
the median injury duration associated with large changes in the maximum26
benefit in two states. Although Meyer, Viscusi
and Durbin's results are not
directly comparable because they focus on the medianspell length, the implied
elasticities in their two states are also
substantially larger than those
found in the past literature. Together, theselongitudinal analyses of
benefit changes should move even a hardenedskeptic in the direction of
believing that the duration of work injuries is responsive to theamount of
workers' compensation benefits that are paid.
Other estimates in the paper document that self-insuranceis associated
with shorter injury spells than (imperfectly experiencerated) private
insurance. Moreover, an increase in workers' compensation benefitshas a
positive effect on injury duration in the sample of firms thatpurchase
insurance from private carriers or from the state fund, but hasa
statistically insignificant effect in the sample of self-insured firms. These
results provide the first evidence that employers' incentivesmay have an
important influence on the duration of employees' injuries.Clearly,
additional evidence on this issue would be useful.
The empirical results presented here suggest that thereare two effective
levers available in workers' compensation insurance to influence theduration
of working time lost due to workplace injuries. The first lever isby
changing the amount of indemnity benefits provided to workers who are injured
on the job; and the second lever is by strengthening the link between
employer's insurance costs and the actual cost of providing injury benefits to
their employees.27
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Notes
1. In 1986, for example, 2.63 percent of working time was lost due to
occupational injuries and illnesses, .05 percent of work days were idled due
to work stoppages involving 1,000 or more employees, and 7.9 percent of labor
force time was lost due to unemployment (see Tables 647, 679, and 681 of U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 1989). For expediency, I will use the term work injury
broadly throughout the paper, including both physical injuries and illnesses.
2. See Ronald Ehrenberg (1988) and Alan Krueger (1990) for recent surveys
of the determinants of the incidence of work-related injuries.
3. This figure is based on the author's calculations of the nationwide
workers' compensation recipiency rate using the March 1988 Current Population
Survey and on the Occupational Safety Health Administration's survey of all
lost-work time accidents.
4. See Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (1988), Chapter 2 and 5.
Because most workers return to work immediately when their temporary total
spell ends, the terms duration of temporary total case and time away from work
will be used interchangeably.
5. Only 13 percent of workers' compensation recipients in Minnesota receive
disability compensation from their employer, and only 3 percent receive other
government support, such as unemployment insurance, medicare, or foodstamps,
during their disability, so little is lost by focusing solely on workers'
compensation benefits (Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry, p. 74).
6, There are some additional, less common exceptions to the benefit-wage
relationship in Figure 1. For example, benefits for volunteer workers are
based on the prevailing wage for that type of job, and benefits for employees
who work irregular hours are based on a five day work week if they work fewer30
than five days per week.
7. See Minnesota Departmentof Labor and Industry
(1988), Chapter 2 and 5.
8.See the survey resultsreported in Minnesota Departmentof Labor and
Industry (1988, pp. 76.79) for evidenceon the Post-injury experienceof
workers' compensation recipients.
9.This estimate is taken from the
Vejbu].l specification model 2in Table 2
of Butler and tJorrall. (1985).
10. Kathleen Classen (1979)and Bruce Meyer (1989)similarly examine
increases in the maxjmtim
unemployment insurance benefit toestimate the effect
of benefit changes on the duration
of unemployment spells. Inrelated work,
Gary Solon (1985) uses a change in thetax status of unemploymentinsurance
benefits to examine the effect ofafter-tax benefits onunemployment spells.
11. The inflation rate
(CPI-Urban) was only 1.1% in 1986,so these benefit
changes represent approximately realchanges in transfer payments.
12. If a claim is initially classified
as a temporary total case, but
reclassified as a permanent partial
case upon the date of maximun medical
improvement, the length of time ontemporary total is counted as the duration
of the temporary total claim. Claimsthat are later reclassifiedas permanent
total injuries are excluded from the dataset. In results that are available
on request, I have estimated Veibul]. duration
models that treat the duration
of permanent partial injuriesas censored at the date of maximum medical
improvement. These estimates lead to
qualitatively similar conclusions.
13. The sample is also limited to
individuals between age 16 and 70 with
complete data who earned less than $5,000per week.31
14. Under the null hypothesis that benefits are unrelated to duration, the
truncation of benefits does not lead to biased estimates. Furthermore, if
higher benefits cause the distribution of spells to shift to the right, right-
hand truncation will lead to an underestimate of the benefit elasticity.
15. The same pattern holds for the median injury duration.
16. Note, however, that the effect of measurement error and idiosyncratic
variations in benefits should be limited because the sample was restricted to
workers whose benefit was within $10 of the benefit based on the schedule.
17. To compare the age and marital status of the workers' compensation
claimants to the overall workforce, I have estimated the age distribution and
marital rate for the sample of Minnesota workers contained in the 1987 Current
Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group Sample. The sample of workers'
compensation recipients is slightly younger than the general workforce, and
about equally likely to be married.
18. The establishment size variable was merged to the data set by the author
on the basis of the firm's Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.
Specifically, the average number of employees per establishment in an industry
was derived from the 1986 County Business Patterns survey of Minnesota (US
Department of Commerce, 1987). and then matchsd to each claimant on the basis
of its firm's four-digit SIC. If average firm sizs at the four-digit level
was not availabis in County Business Patterns, th. three-digit industry level
was used, and so on. Because government employment is excluded from County
Business patterns, it was assumed that th. average establishment size is 1,000
for stats government. 1,000 for the executive branch, and 50 for local governments32
19. For this analysis, injuries
are defined in terms of
three.digjt nature of
injury-part of body cells. For example,a broken toe is considered
separate
from a broken arm. There are 357
injury-classes in the sample thathave an
average duration of less than 10 weeks. A
complete listing of these injuries
is available on request from theauthor.
20. A firm must receive permission from
the Minnesota Department ofCommerce
to self-insure. Although the selection
criteria the Department uses to
determine eligibility are complicated,permission is typically onlygranted to
financially solvent firms with a net worth ofat least two million dollars.
Examples of self-insured firms in Minnesota include
VS Steel, Amoco and
Nabisco (see Minnesota Department of Labor
and Industry, 1989). Self.
insurance may also be granted togroups of employers.
21. Because the state fund utilizes the
same experience rating formula as
private insurance carriers, it is unclearwhy injuries covered by the state
fund have a shorter duration than
injuries covered by private insurance
carriers. A possible explanation for thisfinding is that the state fund
screens out firms with particularly severe
injuries. Alternatively, the state
fund may be more successful inproviding rehabilitation for disabled workers.
22. The covarjates in these specificationsare the same as those in Table 3,
except dummies indicating the season of theyear the worker was injured have
been added to these specifications. Note alsothat the sample for these
regressions includes individuals with earnings in thegrey area of Figure 2.
23. See John Zound (1989), Orley Ashenfelter(1985), and Krueger and Joern-
Steffen Pischke (1989) for econometric solutionsto this problem in analyses
of Disability Insurance, the Negative IncomeTax, and Social Security.